When a rider loses control during a Madison, keirin or sprint, there is no guarantee that the resulting crash can be prevented. Riders compete closely together, contest positions and make decisions at considerable speed, sometimes leaving very little opportunity to recover when something goes wrong. Much of that is inseparable from competitive track cycling, although the consequences of an incident can depend upon circumstances that have little to do with the racing itself. Whether a rider slides across the wooden surface, strikes an exposed barrier, enters the track centre or passes over the outside of the velodrome towards spectators can make an enormous difference to the injuries sustained, even when the initial cause of the crash remains exactly the same.
Our earlier examination, Where Is Track Cycling's Speed Limit?, considered how banking, track geometry and the physical demands of cornering relate to increasingly fast performances. The UCI requires velodromes to meet design criteria calculated for a minimum safe speed of at least 85 km/h, although that engineering requirement does not establish the safety of every form of competition conducted upon the track. An individual rider negotiating the banking at high speed faces different circumstances from a group of sprinters contesting the same section of track, just as a Madison presents challenges that cannot be explained by maximum speed alone.
The progression of athletic performance and equipment development will continue to produce faster riders, and there are legitimate questions about how the sport should accommodate that progression within the established 250-metre environment. Restricting aerodynamic development, changing equipment dimensions or limiting speeds may appear attractive as regulatory responses, but none should automatically be assumed to improve safety simply because performance is reduced.
These are questions for examination rather than a proposed set of new regulations. Some concern the facilities and people surrounding the racing, others the competence of riders or the equipment they use. They will not all offer the same benefit, and some may prove unnecessary. But examining avoidable risks is a better starting point than assuming that restricting performance must be the first response.
What happens when a rider leaves the racing surface?
The crashes involving Matt Walls during the 2022 Commonwealth Games and Katy Marchant and Alessa-Catriona Propster during the 2024 Track Champions League provide particularly relevant examples of the challenges surrounding spectator protection. In both incidents at London's Lee Valley VeloPark, riders travelled beyond the outside of the racing surface and entered areas occupied by spectators. Between those incidents, a new transparent protective barrier had been installed around the velodrome, representing a substantial investment in improving the separation between the racing and the audience.
The fact that riders subsequently went over that barrier does not necessarily mean its installation was misguided or that it failed to provide protection in other circumstances. It does, however, demonstrate why the effectiveness of a barrier cannot be judged by its height or structural strength alone. A rider and bike leaving the banking may travel upwards at an angle, and the forces involved differ considerably from those associated with a straightforward horizontal impact. Preventing a rider from reaching spectators requires an understanding of those trajectories and what happens when the rider encounters the protective structure.
The UCI has strengthened its velodrome fencing requirements, including minimum heights, structural loading and additional protection where significant changes in level exist. Those standards are an important part of modern venue design, but a barrier capable of resisting a specified force is not necessarily one that manages every possible impact effectively. A structure could prevent somebody entering the audience while still presenting a severe impact to the rider, or potentially redirecting them towards other competitors. Its shape, construction, capacity to absorb energy and the distance separating spectators from the track all influence the consequences of an incident.
Existing velodromes deserve consideration alongside newly constructed facilities. Many were built before modern racing speeds and equipment configurations became commonplace, and improvements need not require complete reconstruction. Retrofitting protection, changing exposed barrier profiles or reconsidering spectator separation could offer benefits while preserving the racing surface and the established character of the venue.
Inside the track, riders who lose control towards the track centre may encounter fencing, gates, supports or temporary installations, some presenting considerably harder surfaces than the track itself. The UCI already regulates inner barriers, including protective treatment of their upper edges, although additional energy-absorbing materials might improve protection where riders are most likely to make contact.
Padding cannot simply be installed without considering its behaviour under impact. Its thickness, density and positioning would need to reflect the forces involved, while avoiding projections or reducing the available safety zone. These are engineering questions capable of investigation, with potentially considerable benefits compared with restrictions that affect every competitor throughout an event.
The sport cannot guarantee that riders will never crash. It can ask whether the facilities surrounding them make the resulting injuries more severe than necessary, just as it can question why people who are not competing remain exposed to those crashes.
Who needs to be exposed during a race?
The organisation of the track centre presents another opportunity for improvement, particularly concerning the positioning of commissaires, photographers, coaches, mechanics and other event personnel. All have legitimate responsibilities, although somebody's continued presence in an exposed position should not be considered necessary simply because that has traditionally been where they have stood.
There is an interesting comparison with Formula 1, where photographers, marshals and other race personnel once worked remarkably close to moving cars, often with limited protection from the consequences of a collision. Practices accepted during earlier decades were progressively reconsidered as circuit infrastructure, protective barriers and operational procedures developed. Formula 1 did not need to abandon high-speed competition to recognise that people who were not racing should not be unnecessarily exposed to its hazards.
Track cycling operates in a very different environment, although the underlying principle is relevant. The UCI already restricts access to the safety zone, while allowing commissaires and specifically authorised personnel to occupy it during racing. International competition guidance also provides for photographers working in designated areas of that zone, subject to restrictions intended to reduce their exposure.
The UCI has already taken steps to limit unnecessary access to the racing surface. At the 2026 World Championships in Shanghai, teams received two armbands each for nominated staff, and only those wearing them could enter the track following a mishap once a bunch race had started. The procedure recognised the need to limit the number of people entering during racing, although the separate question remains of who needs to occupy exposed positions throughout an event.
Modern photography equipment offers considerable flexibility, including remote cameras and long lenses, while much race officiating can be undertaken from protected positions using direct observation, timing systems, video coverage and communications technology. Officials will still require access to the track for starting procedures, incidents and other operational duties, although their presence should be determined by the requirements of the task rather than an assumption that standing beside the racing is always the most effective way to perform it.
The position of a commissaire or photographer may appear entirely reasonable throughout hundreds of races without incident. Its suitability can look very different when a rider loses control and travels towards that position, particularly if the person concerned has little opportunity to move clear. Where the same work could be performed from a protected location, the continued exposure offers little obvious sporting benefit.
The same reasoning applies to team personnel, equipment and temporary structures within the track centre. Removing unnecessary people and obstacles could prevent an incident involving one or two riders from becoming something much more serious.
Does an international licence demonstrate track-racing competence?
There is a considerable difference between being an accomplished cyclist and being competent in every discipline of cycling. A rider with extensive road experience may possess exceptional fitness, power and general bike handling, but that experience does not automatically prepare them for racing a fixed-gear bicycle without brakes, negotiating steep banking or maintaining a predictable line when surrounded by other competitors.
Many indoor velodromes require riders to complete an accreditation process before participating independently in advanced training sessions or racing. Before somebody is permitted to ride in a demanding environment, they must demonstrate an appropriate understanding of the equipment, the track and the behaviour expected of other participants. Yet international track cycling does not appear to have a single, universally applied practical accreditation requirement equivalent to those familiar at many indoor venues.
Introducing such a requirement need not involve another expensive licensing procedure or formal training programme. A rider with recognised experience in international track competition could reasonably be considered to have demonstrated the necessary competence already. For somebody entering international track racing without that background, a practical assessment could be incorporated into existing training arrangements before competition begins.
A commissaire or appropriately qualified official could observe the rider completing two or three laps, including specified movements on the banking, controlled changes of line and demonstrations of basic fixed-gear handling. Such an assessment would take only a few minutes, could be undertaken safely before racing at designated times when the track is empty and need not involve any additional charge to the rider or national federation.
It would not demonstrate that somebody possesses the tactical awareness required to compete effectively in a Madison, nor eliminate the possibility of mistakes. It could, however, identify an obvious lack of familiarity with the equipment or velodrome before that rider entered a competitive field.
This could be particularly relevant at international competitions involving nations with limited access to indoor velodromes. The Commonwealth Games provide one example, where riders from countries with very different cycling infrastructures may arrive with considerable road experience but relatively little exposure to steeply banked track racing. That should not become a reason to exclude them, particularly when the international development of the sport depends upon nations having opportunities to participate.
A simple, free assessment at the competition itself would allow riders to demonstrate basic competence without imposing additional travel, training or financial requirements. The sport already checks bicycles and equipment before competition, sometimes to exceptionally precise dimensional tolerances. Taking a few minutes to establish that an unfamiliar rider can competently operate that equipment on the track would seem a proportionate consideration, particularly when the consequences of a loss of control may involve several other competitors.
How many riders should share a 250-metre track?
The number of competitors sharing the racing surface deserves separate consideration, particularly because the circumstances of a Madison, scratch race and points race are not identical.
Current UCI regulations permit up to 24 riders on a 250-metre track, or 18 teams in a Madison, recognising that the size of the racing environment influences how many participants can reasonably compete. Those figures have become familiar features of international competition, but it is reasonable to examine whether they remain appropriate as the sport continues to develop.
A Madison introduces exchanges between partners, differences in speed and riders moving between the racing group and positions further up the banking. Points races involve frequent acceleration and tactical movement around sprint laps, while scratch races can bring large groups together as riders prepare for the finish. Each event creates different patterns of interaction within essentially the same available racing space.
Could maximum field sizes reflect those differences more closely, or should the characteristics of individual velodromes influence the numbers permitted? Two tracks of the same nominal length can have different banking profiles and racing characteristics, while the behaviour of a large Madison field cannot necessarily be compared directly with that of a scratch race.
Reducing a field could decrease congestion and the number of interactions between riders, although fewer competitors would not automatically produce safer racing. Smaller fields could also change the tactical character of events, require additional qualification rounds and place pressure on competition schedules. International participation is another consideration, particularly where a reduction in available places might disproportionately affect nations developing their programmes.
Examining incident rates alongside field sizes, event types and venue characteristics would provide a more useful basis for assessing the existing limits. The number of riders is itself part of what gives certain events their competitive character, and any change would need to offer a meaningful benefit rather than simply produce a smaller race.
Can equipment become safer without sacrificing performance?
The development of track cycling equipment has contributed enormously to the evolution of the sport, particularly where aerodynamic efficiency and the relationship between rider and bicycle are central to performance. Manufacturers have invested heavily in wheels, frames, handlebars and other components, although the demands placed upon that equipment differ considerably between a pursuit and a bunch race.
The UCI's recent equipment regulations have addressed aspects of aerodynamic development through restrictions on dimensions and permitted configurations. The minimum handlebar width of 350 mm for mass-start track racing from January 2027 is one example, while changes to fork dimensions and other aspects of bicycle construction establish boundaries around future designs.
Some restrictions may address particular interactions between bicycles or potentially hazardous component configurations, although a rule intended to contain aerodynamic performance should not automatically be presented as evidence of improved crash safety. Rider fit, control and the physical interaction between components are legitimate considerations, but the dimensions chosen should reflect the particular hazard being addressed rather than the assumption that a less aerodynamic bicycle must necessarily be safer.
Track cycling should also be considered independently of road cycling when examining future equipment requirements. Road racing takes place across changing surfaces, gradients and weather conditions, with braking, cornering and group behaviour that differ considerably from those encountered on a banked velodrome. A regulation developed for a road peloton may have little relevance to a track pursuit, while a concern specific to fixed-gear competition may require a response unnecessary on the road.
Wheels: three, four or five spokes?
Modern elite track racing commonly features composite three-, four- or five-spoke front wheels with rear discs. Conventional spoked wheels still serve training and other forms of track riding, but the demands of elite racing have largely displaced them. Equipment choices at these speeds reflect combinations of stiffness, weight and aerodynamics, not one measure alone. That does not make every conventional wheel unsafe; it makes a general return to them an unconvincing safety response.
The more pertinent question is whether the design of the composite wheels already used at the highest level influences what happens when bicycles make contact. Spoke number alone reveals little about stiffness, steering response or the possibility of entanglement. Shape, spacing and aerodynamic profile may matter more, and a five-spoke wheel cannot be assumed less predictable than a three-spoke. The relevant hazard might concern the way two wheels come together rather than how a wheel behaves in clean air. Conditions inside a velodrome also differ from the changing crosswinds of road racing, making direct comparisons between the disciplines unreliable.
If testing identified a particular profile or construction that introduced a material hazard in bunch racing, a distinction between those events and timed disciplines could be examined. Such testing would need to consider realistic contact and handling conditions, rather than drawing conclusions from spoke count or appearance alone. Without that evidence, a restriction on spoke number would simply narrow equipment choice without establishing that the racing had become safer.
Tyres: the danger of contaminating the racing surface
The movement towards clincher tyres in professional track cycling provides an example of why equipment development must be understood within the environment in which it is used.
Tubular tyres have been central to elite track racing for generations, with their secure attachment to the rim particularly important under the demands of high-speed riding on steep banking. Proper gluing remains the established method for track use, whereas tubular mounting tape, familiar in some road applications, is not considered an appropriate substitute for that level of security.
Improvements in tyre construction and rolling resistance have encouraged teams to investigate and adopt clincher systems, including combinations using tubeless-ready rims and tyres. The distinction is important because a tubeless-ready wheel does not mean that its rider is using a tubeless system. Clincher tyres fitted with inner tubes can be used on compatible tubeless-ready rims, providing an entirely different arrangement from a tubeless tyre operated without an inner tube.
The performance of these systems deserves separate examination, particularly as tyre development continues to influence elite equipment choices. For the purposes of safety regulation, however, there is a more immediate concern surrounding liquid sealant used in tubeless systems on indoor wooden velodromes.
A puncture, tyre displacement or other failure could release latex-based sealant onto the racing surface, creating a serious contamination hazard for riders following at speed. A wooden velodrome cannot simply be washed down like an outdoor road surface, and its finish, cleanliness and consistency are fundamental to maintaining predictable grip when riders negotiate the banking.
Liquid sealant can be exceptionally difficult to remove once it has spread or begun to dry. On a finished wooden track, contamination could require extensive cleaning, specialist treatment or remedial work before the surface could safely be used again. An entire session could be lost, with the possibility of much longer closure if restoring the racing surface proved difficult.
The consequences would extend beyond the rider whose tyre had failed. Other competitors could encounter a contaminated section of track without warning, while the venue operator would face the responsibility of establishing that the surface was completely safe before racing resumed.
There is a strong case for prohibiting liquid tyre sealants in competition on indoor wooden velodromes, irrespective of whether the tyre and rim combination might otherwise be technically compatible. Such a restriction would address an identifiable risk to the racing environment without attempting to contain speed or aerodynamic performance.
It should not be confused with restricting clincher tyres or tubeless-ready wheel designs operated with inner tubes. Those configurations do not require liquid sealant, and their growing presence in professional track cycling should not be interpreted as evidence that teams are necessarily racing with tubeless systems.
UCI approval, ISO standards and elite track equipment
UCI approval already incorporates safety and quality requirements for framesets, while its wheel approval procedure includes impact testing. Those measures matter, but they also raise a separate question: does the evidence required for equipment used in elite track competition adequately represent the loads it will encounter?
ISO 4210 sets out recognised safety and performance tests for bicycles and components, including racing bicycles, but its scope excludes machines designed for severe applications such as sanctioned competition. Meeting the standard therefore provides a useful baseline without necessarily establishing that a product has been tested against every demand of professional track racing. Nor does it imply that a compliant product is unsafe.
There is also a distinction between a bicycle meeting the UCI's dimensional requirements and an individual component demonstrating sufficient structural strength for its intended use. A handlebar can comply with restrictions on width, reach and position without those measurements telling us anything about its resistance to repeated sprint loads. Sporting conformity and testing for mechanical integrity answer different questions, even when both form part of an approval framework.
Respected specialist manufacturers often undertake additional testing, including higher applied loads and more demanding fatigue programmes. Such measures recognise the forces involved when a track sprinter accelerates against the handlebars, stem, cranks, pedals and saddle assembly, and the repeated loading those parts must withstand. The extent of that testing is not necessarily consistent across suppliers, even when their products are intended for comparable competitive use.
A saddle rail or handlebar failing under load can bring down other competitors as well as the rider affected. Individual failures cannot establish a flaw in existing standards, but they illustrate why test conditions should reflect a component's intended use. The UCI has already demonstrated through its wheel approval protocol that it can apply ISO-based requirements more widely without creating a new ISO designation.
That precedent raises a practical question about consistency rather than a demand for every manufacturer to reproduce the private testing programmes of the largest suppliers. Where particular failure modes justify closer attention, the UCI could consider setting a common evidence requirement while allowing manufacturers to demonstrate that their existing procedures already meet it.
One possibility would be additional testing for specific high-load track components. Requiring evidence that a component withstands twice the applied load specified in an existing test is an illustrative mechanism, not a recommended threshold. Twice the test load would not mean twice the safety: static strength, fatigue and impact behaviour are different measures, and any additional requirement would have to reflect actual racing demands.
There would be costs, particularly for smaller specialist manufacturers, and those would have to be justified by a credible benefit. But the distinction is important: asking whether equipment can reliably withstand the forces placed upon it is not the same as restricting its aerodynamic performance.
Helmets and the ability to see where a rider is going
The UCI's regulations taking effect in January 2027 already recognise that different disciplines can justify different equipment requirements. Traditional helmets will be permitted throughout track competition, while time-trial helmets will be restricted to specified events, including the individual and team pursuits, kilometre, team sprint and flying 200 qualification. They will no longer be permitted in match sprint rounds, keirin or bunch racing.
Those changes establish a useful distinction between equipment used in timed events and close-contact competition, although helmet construction is only one part of the relationship between aerodynamic performance and rider safety.
The increasingly extreme positions adopted in pursuit and time-trial events deserve examination for another reason. Riders seeking aerodynamic improvements can adopt high forearm positions, substantial head tilt and postures that reduce frontal exposure, sometimes at the expense of maintaining a clear forward view.
During the men's team pursuit at the Tokyo Olympic Games in 2021, Denmark's Frederik Madsen collided with Great Britain's Charlie Tanfield as the Danish team approached a catch. Madsen was riding with his head down and failed to avoid Tanfield, although the circumstances also involved the position of the British rider and the communication surrounding the developing catch. The incident cannot be reduced to one aspect of riding position alone, but it demonstrates the consequences when a rider travelling at pursuit speed fails to maintain sufficient awareness of what lies ahead.
An individual pursuit or kilometre time trial may appear to present fewer opportunities for such incidents because competitors are not ordinarily negotiating a tightly grouped field. Riders still need to maintain control, understand their position on the track and respond when circumstances do not develop exactly as expected.
There is also the example being set beyond elite competition. Young riders frequently imitate the techniques and equipment choices of the athletes they admire, sometimes without the experience required to reproduce them safely. An aerodynamic position that an accomplished international competitor can sustain under carefully managed conditions may be far less appropriate for somebody developing their basic skills.
The UCI already regulates the dimensions and positioning of time-trial extensions, and forward visibility could be considered more directly within that framework. Rather than prescribing an arbitrary forearm angle or prohibiting advanced aerodynamic positions, an appropriate requirement might examine whether riders can maintain an adequate view of the track ahead while using their equipment as intended.
Any such requirement would need a practical and repeatable assessment method, recognising differences in rider anatomy and the demands of individual events. It should also preserve the team pursuit as one of track cycling's principal showcases for technological development, rather than imposing restrictions whose safety benefits had not been established.
There is little reason why the pursuit should be regulated identically to a Madison simply because both take place on the same velodrome. Equally, the absence of bunch racing does not mean that every extreme aerodynamic position is appropriate. Preserving technical innovation and ensuring that riders can see where they are going should be compatible objectives.
Understanding the incidents before changing the regulations
A high-speed crash can attract considerable attention, particularly when several riders are involved or the consequences extend into spectator areas. The speed at which the riders were travelling is an obvious characteristic of the incident, although it may not explain why the initial contact occurred. A wheel overlap, unexpected change of line, momentary loss of traction or mechanical failure can produce a crash at speeds considerably below those reached by the fastest sprinters.
Speed still matters because the energy involved generally increases with the square of velocity, but reducing that energy is not necessarily the only way to improve the outcome. The cause of a crash, the equipment involved, the proximity of other riders and the structures encountered afterwards can all influence its consequences. A slower race conducted beside an unnecessarily severe barrier may still present an avoidable injury risk, while better protection could reduce the seriousness of an incident without changing the speed at which it occurs.
A systematic examination of track-racing incidents would provide a valuable foundation for future decisions. Understanding how often particular types of contact occur, which events and circumstances are involved, and whether injuries result primarily from collisions between riders, equipment failures or contact with the surrounding environment would allow the sport to distinguish between problems requiring different responses.
Such analysis would also need to account for the number of competitors, frequency of events, rider experience and the characteristics of individual venues. A discipline involving more recorded incidents is not necessarily more dangerous without considering how much racing takes place and how many competitors are exposed.
The UCI's responsibility for equipment and competition safety extends well beyond setting dimensional limits. The incidents considered here point to different kinds of risk: what riders strike after a fall, who is exposed beside the racing, whether competitors can control their bicycles and whether the equipment they use can withstand its intended demands. Those questions require different evidence and may lead to very different responses.
The 250-metre velodrome has supported generations of athletic and technological development, and its disciplines remain distinctive. A team pursuit combines collective performance with extraordinary engineering; a Madison or keirin demands a different set of technical and tactical skills. A regulation appropriate to one need not be right for another.
A dimensional restriction is relatively straightforward to write and enforce, whereas examining why riders crash, what they strike and how an incident develops requires more difficult investigation. That is not a reason to reject equipment regulation where it is justified. It is a reason to distinguish measures that address a demonstrated hazard from those that merely constrain performance, and to give infrastructure and event organisation the same serious attention as the equipment itself.
Track cycling will continue to produce crashes, and some will inevitably result in injuries or worse. The sport can, however, influence what happens when those incidents occur. As performances improve, the venues, working practices and equipment requirements surrounding racing should develop with equal ambition. That is how track cycling can improve its protections without diminishing the competition that makes those performances meaningful.